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ABSTRACT
RATIONALITY AND ILLUSIONS OF HEALTH

MAY 2000
PAUL NORRIS,
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B.F.A.,
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M.S.,

RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Seymour Epstein

People use two different modes of thinking:
heuristic. Individuals

who

rational or analytic,

and experiential or

describe themselves as highly rational report low levels of

psychological dysfunction. But some highly rational individuals

may

be classifiable as

repressors, denying a high level of psychological distress because they regard

socially undesirable.

It

was hypothesized

that highly rational individuals

who

it

as

are

low

in

experientiality will typically demonstrate heightened reactivity to stress in the absence

of self-reported psychological
high

distress,

in experientiality will not.

while highly rational individuals

who

are also

42 male and 34 female college students replied

to

standard self-report inventories and underwent mildly psychologically stressful tasks.

Heart rate and blood pressure were measured before and

after the stressor.

Analysis of

physiological measures and mood-adjective checklists revealed significant differences

between the high rational/high experiential group and the
though

in the direction opposite to that hypothesized.

been supported, there was evidence

that high levels

with illusory mental health.

iv

overall

mean

for all subjects,

Although the hypothesis had not

of rationality

may

be associated
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CHAPTI'R

1

INTRODUCTION
People commonly distinguish between
logical analysis and

between coldly rational thought and a more

thumb decision-making.

fallible,

is

& Cacioppo,

1986; Schneider

rough equivalence between

seen as a source of error.

more automatic,

& Shiffrin,

intentionality, rationality,

the other hand, the automatic

mode

is

habitual

mode

(Chaiken,

1977). In these models, there

and accuracy of processing.

is

a

On

used when the task lacks sufficient importance, or

the mdividual lacks the cognitive resources, to

it is

often valued

is

psychology, dual-process models differentiate
between intentional,

deliberative information processing, and a

1980; Petty

emotionally-tinged or rule-of-

Especially in the realm of science, one
extreme

as reliable and discriminating, while the
other

In social

intuitive leaps,

employ the more

intentional

mode. Thus

regarded by these theories as less accurate and therefore less
dependable than the

intentional: an inferior substitute for true rationality.

Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-theory

Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj,

experiential processing.

& Heier,

The former

(CES

f;

Epstein, 1973, 1990;

1994) differentiates between rational and

is linear,

intentional,

and analytic, the

latter

emotionally-influenced, holistic, and intuitive. However, unlike other dual-process

models,

right,

CEST specifically

describes the experiential system as adaptive in

its

own

not less than the rational system. Learning from and utilizing one's experience,

independently of conscious awareness, was the decision-making system used over the
greater part of humanity's evolutionary history. Even today,

1

it

is

perfectly adequate for

common processmg
who

tasks.

This view

is

shared by theorists of the cognitive
unconscious,

see the bulk of information processing
occurring automatically, and more

efficiently than

by means of deliberative processing (Greenwald,
1992; Kihlstrom,

1987; Reber, 1989).

Experientiality can be

interactions

effective than rationality.

Most

interpersonal

and projections of future outcomes involve a host of
mutually

interdependent variables:

all

more

it

is

prohibitively cognitively-intensive to attempt
to specify

of these variable with a high degree of accuracy (see

a Reeling' can be

more

Hill, 1988). In these situations,

useful than a fact.

Investigation of the relative utilization of the two systems tends
to focus on the

degree to which individuals are motivated to use the more
(e.g.,

Cacioppo, Petty, Kao,

& Rodriguez,

that, as the experiential is the default

that this

system

attributes as

is

1986).

system,

it

is

effortful, rational

The assumption

is

system

apparently

equally available to

all. It is

made

possible

capable of refinement, improvement, or development. Such human

common sense

and wisdom do not depend solely on conscious

analytical

reasoning; and they are recognized as present to a greater or lesser degree, changing

over time.

Interaction of the

What

is

Two

Systems

the relationship between the experiential and the rational systems?

Previous research (Norris

& Epstein,

1996) suggests that the two systems arc

independent of each other. Using the Rational/Experiential Inventory (Epstein, Norris,

& Pacini,

1995), a self-report measure of ability and valuation for the two modes.

2

subjects' rationality

and experientiality scores were found

Thus, individuals can be more or

less rational

can be high in one and not the other, high

to be effectively independent.

and more or

in both, or

The hypothesis of the above research was

low

less experiential: that

is,

they

in both.

that individuals

who

are capable of

high levels of both types of processing will be more
psychologically healthy than those

who

are limited to a single

expand the

mode. The

ability to resolve conflicts

ability to integrate the

and

individuals able to respond flexibly to

difficulties (see

life's

two systems should

Labouvie-Vief, 1990). Thus,

demands should be characterized by

a

relatively balanced ability to use both systems, while
those limited to one system should

be more subject to psychological

distress.

This hypothesis was not completely supported in the previous research
(Norris

& Epstein,

1996). Using a 2 (rationality)

X 2 (experientiality) analysis of variance

design to analyze self-report measures of psychological adjustment, two groups
were
clearly differentiated

in rationality

from

and high

all

others.

The

in experientiality,

first,

had

the group

composed of individuals low

significantly higher levels of psychological

dysfunction; the second, the group high in rafionality but low in experientiality, showed
a significant absence of psychological distress. Investigation of main effects showed
that rationality

was

overall a positive attribute, strongly associated with lower levels of

distress. Rationality is evidently

rational,

a characteristic of mental health, and the inability to be

coupled with a strong experiential bent,

However, although
experientiality

was not

rationality

is

was shown

a predictor of distress.

to

be an adaptive

attribute,

necessarily maladaptive. Individuals high in both rationality and

3

experientiality

low

were not significantly more distressed
than those high

in experientiality;

in rationality

and

on several measures of positive adjustment,
they had scores

indicative of significantly higher levels
of ftinctioning than the

groups. Thus, although rationality

is

mean of the

other three

apparently sufficient to guarantee
freedom from

dysfimction, experientiality has a moderating
effect: in conjunction with
rationality,

it is

conducive to positive ftinctioning.

Why is a high level of experientiality associated with lower levels

of

psychological distress for those high in rationality, but
with higher levels for those low
in rationality?

One

possibility

is

that both systems are necessary, but the
absence of a

strong experiential apfitude has consequences that can
be ignored or suppressed by the
individual. Thus, individuals

immune

low

in experientiality

to psychological distress, but are either

unwilling to acknowledge

it.

If this

and high in rafionality

unaware of their

level

may

not be

of distress or

group does show higher levels of denial, and

individuals high in both rationality and experienfiality do not

show high

if

levels of denial,

the difference could be attributed to experientiality. Like rationality, then,
experientiality

would provide

benefits to the individual, and

its

absence would be

reflected in higher levels of dysfimction. Is there evidence that individuals high in

rationality

and low in experientiality are also characterized by denial of psychological

distress?

Illusory Mental Health

A distinction can be made, for individuals reporting low levels of anxiety,
between those who also report low

levels of defensiveness or social desirability, and

4

those

who report high

1979).

The former

levels of defensiveness (Weinberger,
Schwartz,

are regarded as truly

low

& Davidson,

in anxiety, while the latter are
regarded as

repressors, "traditionally defined as persons
manifesting heightened recognition

thresholds for anxiety-provoking stimuli, [who]
consistently avoid disturbing cognitions

across a variety of perceptual, projective, and learning
tasks"
repressors report

low

levels of anxiety, they

(p. 369).

show evidence of high

Although

levels of stress, as

assessed by physiological and behavioral measures of reactivity to
psychologically
stressful tasks.

More

recently, Shedler,

Mayman, and Manis

(1993) have illustrated the inability

of standard self-report measures to distinguish those truly low in neuroticism from
those
characterized by what they call illusorv mental health Their distinction
.

of Weinberger

is

et al. (1979):

psychologically healthy.

psychologically distressed,

is

similar to that

of those reporting low levels of neuroticism, "one subgroup

A

second subgroup

who

is

made up of people who

are

maintain an illusion of mental health through defensive

denial of psychological distress" (p. 1117; emphasis in original). This latter group

found

to

show higher

was

levels of reactivity to stress, using both physiological and

behavioral measures. In contrast to the use by Weinberger et

as independent variables, however, the

two groups were

al.

of self-report measures

differentiated

by discrepancy

versus agreement between self-report measures of psychological distress and objective

evaluations of the individual. This enabled researchers to avoid the potential confound

of relying on a self-report measure of defensiveness, which

5

may

fail

to

measure

defensiveness and instead measure oversocialization
and inhibition (Shedler

et al.,

1993;

Weinberger, 1990).

It is

important to note that in both studies, repressors
or defensive deniers had

higher levels of reactivity to psychological stress than
individuals
levels of neuroticism

and anxiety. At the same time,

in

who

Weinberger

reported high

et al. (1979), the

repressors reported high levels of defensiveness,
but lower levels of trait anxiety than
the low-anxious group. Thus, in a previous study
(Norris

the

low

& Epstein,

1994), the status of

rationality/high experientiality group as the most
psychologically disturbed

be due neither to the negative consequences of high experientiality,
nor

of rationality's beneficial

effects, but to that group's willingness to

psychological distress; distress which

may

may

to the absence

acknowledge

actually be shared, or exceeded, by

repressors.

In order to understand the interaction of rationality

consequences for psychological functioning,
those groups under consideration

from other groups

may

it

is

and

experientiality,

and

its

necessary to determine whether any of

be largely composed of repressors, and

differ

in this respect.

Overview of Present Study

The independent

variables in the present study were the previously used self-

report measures of rationality and experientiality (Norris

to control for the effect

of social

desirability

and

in

& Epstein,

1994). In addition,

order to replicate Weinberger

et al.'s

(1979) independent variable of repression, a self-report measure of defensive social

desirability

was used

in selecting subjects.

Subjects responded to self-report measures
of anxiety, self-deception, and an

inventory of medical conditions and symptoms.
Subjects were then subjected to
mild

psychological stress, induced using Thematic
Apperception Test cards and a phrase

response task. Latencies to the phrase response
task, measures of blood
pressure and
heart rate, as well as subjects' responses to
a mood-adjective checklist, were
taken over
the course of the experiment.

The crux of the study was

the assessment of illusory

mental health, the discrepancy between self-reported
adjustment and physiological

measures of stress. This study
Shedlcr

et al.

(

1

is

thus an adaptation of Weinberger et

al.

(1979) and

993). Note, however, that in both of these studies, illusory
mental health

or defensive denial

was used

as an independent, rather than dependent, variable.
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CHAPTER 2

METHODS
Subjects

Subjects were 76 University of Massachusetts
students, 42

who were compensated

men and 34 women,

for participation with credits towards
course requirements.

Subjects were selected from a pool of respondents
to a pre-screening questionnaire,

administered as a course requirement for introductory
psychology,

statistics

and

methods courses.
Subjects were randomly selected from the cells of a
two-by-two matrix,
constructed from the upper and lower quartiles of rationality
and experientiality, using
separate

means

for

men and women,

as their distributions differ

on both measures

(see

Materials section for descriptions). In addition, each cell was subdivided
by a median
split

on

social desirability (using the values for

men and women

for the entire

sample of

respondents), in order to ensure approximately equal representation of high and low

values of this variable.

Materials

Subjects were selected using the Rational Versus Experiential Inventory
(Epstein, Norris,

& Pacini,

1995), a 20-item self-report instrument using a Likert-type

scale of agreement or disagreement.

mind"

(rational ability)

experientiality, "I trust

tend to use

my

and

my

"I

Sample items

for rationality are "I

have a logical

enjoy intellectual challenges" (rational favorability); for

initial feelings

heart as a guide for

my

about people" (experiential ability) and

"I

actions" (experiential favorability). Defensive

8

social desirability

was measured using

the Defensiveness subscale of
Epstein's

Ego

Strength Scale (adapted in part from the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale).
Physiological measurements of systolic blood
pressure, diastolic blood pressure,

and pulse
study.

rate

were made by finger plethysmograph

At each of these times, three

different readings

plethysmograph, to compensate for inaccuracies

The median reading was used

at specified intervals

throughout the

were taken by finger

in the admittedly

low-tech equipment.

for all analyses; analyses using the initial
readings

were

not significantly different.

Following each physiological measurement, subjects responded
mood-adjective checklist. Seven emotional

states

to a seven-item

were characterized by a

set

of three

adjectives each, and subjects indicated the extent to which their emotional
state could be

described by each set of adjectives. The seven emotional states were
irritated,

alert, tense, tired,

calm, anxious, and jittery.

The
self-report

short

form of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale (Bendig, 1956) served

measure of psychological

as a

distress. In addition, subjects' responses to the

Beck Depression Inventory, administered on

the pre-screening questionnaire, were

available as a supplementary dependent variable. Subjects also responded to a 35-item

inventory concerning medical

symptoms and problems, and

of the Self-Deception Scale (Sackeim

& Gur,

a

1

9-item abridged version

1979).

Procedure

Prospective subjects were selected fi^om the subject pool based on their scores on

the

REI and defensive

social desirability scale.

9

They were contacted by telephone and

invited to participate in the study. All
subjects were run individually, by one
of three

female research assistants,

in a laboratory containing

only a table, two chairs, and the

experimental materials.
Self-report

Measure

At the beginning of the
questionnaires, writing

some

stories,

blood pressure would be taken
filling

told,

your

session, subjects were told that they

at

and responding

would be answering

spoken phrases, and

to

that their

various points. After signing a consent form
and

out a credit opscan sheet, they were asked to wash their
hands. They were then

"Now, before we continue,
chair."

They were

I

want you

to relax a bit. Just sit

back comfortably

in

told to close their eyes and breathe quietly for a couple
of

minutes. At the end of two minutes, subjects' heart rate and blood
pressure were

recorded three times, using the finger plethysmograph. Following

responded to the seven-item mood-adjective

checklist.

this, subjects

They were then given

form of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, the medical inventory, and the
Deception Scale. After responding

to the measures, heart rate

the short

Self-

and blood pressure

readings were taken again, and subjects responded to the mood-adjective scale.

Psvchologicallv Stressfijl Tasks

Following the self-report measures,
administered.

stressftil,

I

The

TAT response task,

was given

am

first. It

TAT and phrase association tasks were

which was expected

was introduced

as follows:

going to show you a series of pictures, and

about each one. Tell

what the outcome

me what

will be.

is

to be less psychologically

happening

I

want you

in the picture,

to

make up

what led up

a story

to

it,

and

Also describe what the characters are thinking and

10

fedmg. [This and the following

Subjects were then

shown

three

instruction

were adapted from Shedler

TAT cards, one at a time.

Each one was turned

over and held upright for three minutes, during
which time subjects wrote
in a booklet

provided for the purpose. The

first

card (card

et al.,

3BM) shows

a

their stories

woman,

huddled on the end of a couch, with what might
be a gun lying on the floor next

The second (card 8GF) shows an
1

back

to the viewer; the older

woman

is stiff.

a naked

The

woman,

stands with his

older

woman holding

woman's expression

third (card

13MF) shows

a

is

man

a younger

strange,

her

and her grip on the younger

standing next to a bed, in which

apparently asleep but possibly dead; the

arm over

woman, with

to her.

man

is

fully clothed,

his eyes, in a dramatic pose. After the card

lies

and

was shown

for three

minutes, the next card was turned over and the research assistant
said, "Okay, stop
writing and turn to the next page."

Following the

TAT response task, the research assistant

introduced the phrase

association task as follows:

For

this next part I'm

going to play a tape of some sentences to you. After each
want you to say the first thing that comes to mind, as quickly as
possible. Give me a complete sentence or idea, not just a word. Anything you
sentence,

I

say as a response

there are no right or

wrong answers. Just say the first
phrase that comes to mind. Please speak loudly and clearly, and try to relax
is fine,

between sentences.

The research

assistant then started a tape recorder

on which

thirteen phrases

were recorded. Each phrase was followed by a thirty-second period of silence, during

which the subject was

to

respond to the phrase. The

content, e.g., "The dairy farm bought cows."

11

first

three phrases

were neutral

The next four phrases were based on

in

themes of dependency, balanced between male and female givers
and

mother had

to support

three phrases

The

last three

were aggressive

in content, e.g.,

phrases were sexual

Subjects' responses

last

him" and "She pleaded with her

receivers: "His

lather" arc examples.

Relaxation

to the

hc next

"The stepmother brutally beat the

in content, e.g.,

"His girlfriend

were recorded on a second tape

child."

very promiscuous."

is

recorder. Following the subject's

response, the research assistant took their blood pressure and heart

responded

I

rate,

and subjects

mood-adjective checklist.

1

The research assistant then debriefed the subject, as follows:

One of the
anxiety.

things this experiment

is

about

The cards you were shown, and

designed to be a

little

is

learning

how

people react to

you responded

the sentences

to,

unsettling, in order to get spontaneous responses.

were

So

if you
embarrassed about anything you said or wrote, remember that's
normal. In fact, being able to express embarrassing thoughts may actually mean
you're well-adjusted. That's one of the things this study is investigating.

feel at all

Subjects were then told to

minutes. Following

this, their

sit

back and relax with

blood pressure and heart

their

rate

eyes closed, for two

were again taken, and they

responded to the mood-adjective checklist.
Relaxation 2

Finally, subjects

were

told that experimenters

wanted

to get a

blood pressure under conditions of maximum relaxation. They were

measurement of

told to sit

back and

close their eyes, and the research assistant started a tape recorder with a guided imagery

relaxation instructions.

air

The

and hear the waves, and

tape told them to picture themselves on a beach, to smell the

to relax the

muscles

in specific parts

of

their neck, face,

shoulders and arms. The instructions took approximately one minute; for another two

12

minutes, subjects sat with their eyes closed, listening to
the tape recording play sounds

of surf on a beach. At the end of three minutes
stretch slowly, take a

their

deep breath, and open

blood pressure and heart

rate,

in all, the tape recording told subjects
to

their eyes.

and they responded

The research
to the

assistant then took

mood-adjective checklist.

Dependent Variables
Illusory mental health, the discrepancy between actual and
self-reported

psychological distress, was operationalized as the physiological measure of stress
or
reactivity

minus the corresponding

self-report of anxiety. This defines physiological

arousal as evidence of anxiety, and assumes that self-report of anxiety or tension

assesses an equivalent phenomenon.

Subjects responded to two different measures of anxiety.

One was

the Taylor

Manifest Anxiety Scale, a measure of trait anxiety, and the other was the moodadjective checklist administered following each measurement of blood pressure and

heart rate. Because both repeated-measures and between-subjects measures of anxiety

were

available, discrepancy scores

were calculated using each type of variable.

The repeated-measures discrepancy
measurement times, using the

variable

was calculated

self-reported mood-adjective ratings.

for each of the five

Of the

seven

adjective sets included in the mood-adjective checklist, five are descriptive of states of

arousal or reactivity: "tense, stressed, or on edge", "worried, anxious, or nervous",

"irritated,

annoyed, or angry",

"jittery,

opposite state, "calm, relaxed, or

dmes grouped

shaky, or unsettled"; the

at ease".

fifth triad

describes the

Factor analysis for each of the measurement

these five sets in one factor, distinct from a factor

13

composed of the

other

two

sets ("alert, alive, or enthusiastic"

and

weary, or unreactive"). Internal-

"tired,

consistency reliability analyses showed acceptable internal
coherence for the composite
anxiety measure (for the five measurement times,

all

item-total correlations

>

.35, all alphas

>

.80).

all

mean

For

this

inter-item correlations ^ .50,

measure, the triads that

include the adjectives "anxious" or "tense" loaded most highly,
and the triads that

include the adjectives "calm" (reversed) or "angry" loaded least highly.
The low

loadings for the reversed "calm" triad were unexpected. Possibly the loadings
are
affected by the reversed direction.

To

calculate the repeated-measure discrepancy vaiiable, the two measures
must

both be adjusted to comparable metrics. For

this purpose, range-corrected scores

were

calculated for both the physiological and self-report measures. Range-corrected scores
are a

form of ipsatization. They represent each measurement

of scores for each subject, by expressing

and the subject's

minimum

it

as the difference

as a proportion of the range

between the

specific score

score in the five periods, divided by the subject's overall

range, as follows: (specific score

-

minimum score)/(maximum

The repeated-measures discrepancy

variables were then

score

computed

-

minimum

score).

as the range-

corrected physiological measure (systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, or

heart rate)

minus the range-corrected composite anxiety measure. High scores thus

represent high physiological reactivity relative to self-reported anxiety or tension, an

indicafion of illusory mental health.

The between-subjects discrepancy measures were
between

subjects' self-ratings of general anxiety
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and

calculated as the difference

their over-all

measures of

physiological reactivity, for each of the three physiological
indices. For this purpose, the
five

measurements

for each type of physiological

to adjust the physiological

standardized.

measurement were averaged.

and self-report measures

The between-subjects discrepancy

to

In order

comparable metrics, each was

variables were then

standardized average physiological measure minus the standardized

computed
trait

as the

anxiety

measure. Again, high score represented illusory mental health.

Two

sets

of between-subjects discrepancy measures were calculated, using two

measures of over-all anxiety. The

first

used the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, a

measure of trait anxiety. The second used the composite anxiety measure. For
variable, the five

this

composite anxiety scores were averaged. The averaged score was

standardized and subtracted from the standardized average physiological measure. This
variable

is

effecdvely a reformulation of the repeated-measures discrepancy variable, in

a between-subjects format, using standardized as opposed to range-corrected scores.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
For both the repeated-measures and
between-subjects discrepancy variables,
their

component physiological and

self-report variables

differences. All between-subjects variables

low)

X 2 (experientiality, high vs.

low)

were analyzed

were analyzed using a 2

X2

for

group

(rationality,

high vs.

(gender of subject) analysis of variance

design. All repeated-measures variables
were analyzed using a 2 (rationality, high
vs.

low)

X2

(experientiality, high vs. low)

X2

(gender of subject)

X

5 (trials) design,

except as noted. Planned contrasts were also
performed, comparing the mean for the

high rationality/low experientiality group

and the mean

to the overall

mean

for the other three groups,

for the high rationality/high experientiality
group to the overall

mean

for

the other three groups.

Repeated-measures Discrepancy Measures
Discrepancy scores were calculated for each of the five measurement
periods, by
subtracting the range-corrected composite anxiety measure from each
of the three range-

corrected physiological measures (systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood
pressure, and
heart rate).

Repeated-measures Physiological Measurements
Preliminary analysis of physiological measurements for
that the manipulations

pattern

all

had not worked as anticipated (see Figure

would have begun with

fairly

subjects indicated

1).

The expected

low readings of blood pressure and

heart rate,

representing baseline measurements. The second readings, after answering
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questionnaires,

much

would have been

slightly higher; the third, following
the stress tasks,

higher; the fourth, following debriefing
and a short recovery period,

been lower (comparable

to the

second or

relaxation period with guided imagery,

recovery period reading, as

it

beyond the recovery period

relaxation.

measurements showed no
df, all

ps >

.10).

stress effect

stress task,

2.00 on

2,

The

first

was found

and
144

first).

The

final reading,

following the

would have shown a modest decrease from

would include a

floor effect, subjects

who

last

for the

middle three periods (before the

<

2.0

on

4,

284

A

stress task, after the

measures

(all

Fs >

ps <.10). The heart-rate deceleration for the post-stress period

have reflected subjects' increased attention

An additional

did not relax

measurement periods were evidently anomalous.

after the recovery period) for all three physiological

df, all

the

However, repeated-measures analysis of the raw

effect for trials for any of the indices (all
Fs

and

would have

may

to the stress tasks.

complication was the low correlation of the three physiological

indices with each other.

The average

diastolic, across the five trials,

was

correlation of systolic blood pressure with

quite high (average r

=

.83,

p <.010).

Systolic blood

pressure and heart rate, however, were not significantly correlated (average

r

=

.04, ns).

Diastolic blood pressure and heart rate were only moderately correlated (average

r

=

.28,

p<010).
Analysis of range-corrected systolic blood pressure over the five

no significant main
either

by

showed

effects or interactions for rationality, experientiality, or gender,

between or within

experienfiality

trials

subjects. Range-corrected heart rate

trials interaction,

F (4,272) =

17

3.46,

showed a

^ < 010, due

significant

to the

high heart rates

for low-experiential subjects at the
final, relaxation period,
while high-expenential

subjects had their highest rate at the

baseline measurement period.

first,

Between-subjects effects were found for both
systolic blood pressure and heart
rate.

Heart rate showed a significant between-subjects
rationality by experientiality

interaction,

the

F (1,68) =

low rational/low

other

4.81,

p <.04, with

the high rational/high experiential
group and

experiential group showing higher average
heart rates than the

two groups. For

systolic blood pressure, there

was a

significant between-subjects

contrast of the high rationality/high experientiality
group to the

groups, F (1,71)

=

5.89,

p

mean

for the other three

<.02, with that group's average blood pressure
higher than the

others'.

Most

relevant to the results of the discrepancy measure (described
below),

range-corrected diastolic blood pressure showed a significant rationality
by
experientiality

by gender by

This interaction

<.03, and for

is

trials interaction,

F (4,268) =

4.97,

significant or nearly significant both for

women, F

or contrasts, either for

(4,1 16)

men

or

=

2.34,

p

women or

p <.001

(see Figure 2).

men, F (4,152) =

2.80,

p

=.059. There were no significant main effects

for both.

Analysis of the pattern of measurements for men, using means comparisons

each of the five measurement periods, shows significant differences for the

significant difference

between the mean

group, with the highest

initial

two

first

periods (the baseline and the pre-stress periods). For the baseline period, there

at

is

a

for the high rationality/high experientiality

blood pressure of any group, and the high rationality/low

experientiality group, with the lowest. For the pre-stress period, there
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is

a significant

difference between the

Low

groups.

in

in

comparable

men

and each of the other three

in the other three groups,

blood pressure from the baseline period

that high rational/h.gh experiential

blood pressure than

in the

experientiality

rational/low experiential men, unlike

showed an increase
Note also

low rationality/low

men

men

to the pre-stress period.

tended to show more extreme changes

in the other three groups. Their
initial reading

to their post-stress reading, while they

showed

was

greater relaxation responses

subsequent readings.

The
means,

analysis for

in the

women

produces only one significant difference between

recovery period. High rational/low experiential

lower blood pressure for
rational/high experiential

this period than either

women. The two

from the post-stress

to the recovery period.

women,

shows a

in contrast,

women

have significantly

low rational/low experiential or high

latter

groups show no relaxation response

The group of high

rational/low experiential

definite relaxation response, with relatively

low blood

pressure in the recovery period.

Repeated-measures Composite Anxietv Variable
Analysis of the range-corrected composite anxiety measure produced no
significant effects, interactions, or contrasts. (See Figure 3.) Note, however, that

subjects reported feeling

most anxious

at the

beginning of the experiment. As the

experiment continued, their ratings of anxiety declined, increasing
stress

measurement period, and ending with a low
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rating.

slightly at the post-

Repeated- measures Discrep ancy Scores

Most

subjects

showed a tendency

blood pressure readings, for the

measurement periods,

first

their ratings

to give

high estimates of anxiety, relative
to

two measurement

of anxiety were low

periods.

By

the last

relative to their

two

blood pressure.

Analysis of the difference between range-corrected
physiological measurements

and the range-corrected composite anxiety measure
over the

five periods

produced no

significant effects, interactions, or contrasts for
the measures using systolic blood

pressure or heart rate.

rafionality

by

The measure using

experientiality

diastolic

by gender by

blood pressure showed a significant

trials effect,

F (4,240) =

3.73,

p <.010

(see

Figure 4); no contrasts were significant.

For men, there are no significant main

effects, interactions, or contrasts for the

repeated-measures discrepancy using diastolic blood pressure. Means comparisons

at

each of the five measurement periods show significant differences only for the
prestress period, with the discrepancy score for the

low

rationality/high experientiality

group higher than that for the low rationality/low experientiality group. The low
rational/low experiential group, unlike the other groups,

stress period than their

result

2).

anxious in the pre-

blood pressure would indicate. This discrepancy

of their relatively high blood pressure during

Although

felt less

their pattern

this

is

evidently a

measurement period

(see Figure

of composite anxiety ratings from the beginning of the

experiment to the pre-stress period followed roughly the same declining pattern as those
for the other groups, their

blood pressure actually rose during
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this interval.

For women, there
trials interaction for

3.19,

p

<.02.

is

a significant within-subjects
rational by experiential by

the discrepancy measure using
diastolic blood pressure, F
(4,112)

Means comparisons

at

=

each of the five measurement periods
show

significant differences only for the recovery
period, with the discrepancy score
for the

high rationality/low experientiality group
significantly lower than that for the
low
rationality/low experientiality group.

anxious

in the

The low

rational/low experiential

women

felt less

recovery period than their blood pressure
would indicate; their relatively

high blood pressure for that measurement would
explain

this (see

Figure

2).

On

the

other hand, their low blood pressure in the pre-stress
period would explain their high

discrepancy score

in the

at this time.

High rational/low

experiential

women

felt

more anxious

recovery period than their blood pressure would indicate.
Their anxiety score for

this period is

an increase over that

for the post-stress period,

and

their

blood pressure

reading a decrease.

Finally, although there

were no

using systolic blood pressure or heart

over-all effects for the discrepancy measures

rate, analysis

of these measures

produced significant rational by experiential interactions
blood pressure, F = 2.53, p <.05;

for the

measure using heart

pattern for the measure using systolic blood pressure

diastolic blood pressure, although no

the measure using heart rate

women

for final

is

women

measure using

rate,

F = 2.59, p

systolic

<.05).

The

almost identical to that using

means comparisons

are significant.

The

pattern for

shows few evident differences between groups, and means

comparisons show only higher discrepancy scores
experiential

(for the

for

two periods,

for the

group of low rational/low

the recovery and relaxation periods.

21

We can explain the significant repeated-measures discrepancy
result

of changes in blood pressure, rather than
in self-ratings of anxiety. As
the

adjective check-list

is

scores as the

was administered

in conjunction with the

noteworthy that the two did not produce similar

results.

blood pressure readings,

it

Regarding the hypothesized

comiection between either of the two high-rational
groups and illusory mental health,
the only result

is

negative: for

women,

the high rational/low experiential group

showed

the opposite of illusory mental health in the recovery
period, over-reporting anxiety
relative to

blood pressure.

Between-subiects Discrepancy Measures

There are two types of between-subjects discrepancy measures, each
based on a
single self-report

measure of anxiety and a

single score for each of the three

physiological indices (systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure,
and heart

The physiological measure used

for both discrepancy variables

is

rate).

the average of the five

repeated-measures physiological readings, for each of the three indices. One
discrepancy measure

measure and a

trait

is

the difference between the standardized averaged physiological

anxiety measure. The other uses the average of the five repeated-

measures composite anxiety scores (described above). These two measures of anxiety

show

a moderate correlation (r

=

.38,

p <.010). The

measures correlate highly with each other

(rs

resulting

range from .68 to .72,

For the between-subjects discrepancy measures and

the rational

their

by experiential by gender analysis was based on

freedom; contrasts were based on

1

two types of discrepancy

1

ps <.010).

component measures,

and 68 degrees of

and 72 degrees of freedom.
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all

Averaged Physiolog ica Measures
l

Analysis of the average of the five
measurements of systolic blood pressure

produced only a significant effect

for gender,

F = 14.71, p <.001 the average blood
:

pressure for

men was

higher than that that for women. There
were no other significant

effects, interactions or contrasts, for the
average

blood pressure, or heart

rate.

(See Table

of systolic blood pressure, diastolic

1).

Between-subiects Anxietv Measures
Analysis of the

trait

anxiety measure produced no significant
effects,

interactions or contrasts. Analysis of the average
of the five composite anxiety variables

produced a main effect for

rationality,

F=

6.06,

p <.02, with low-rational subjects

giving higher self-ratings of anxiety. There was also a significant
experiential by gender
mteraction, F

=

4.08,

separate analysis for

(1,30)

=

10.48,

£

^

<.05. Separate analysis for

women showed

a significant

<.005, with low-experiential

Most important

men showed no
main

women

effects,

while

effect for experientiality,

F

reporting high levels of anxiety.

for the interpretation of the discrepancy

measure (described

below), a significant contrast was found for the composite anxiety measure between the

mean

for the high rationality /high experientiality group and the

groups, F

=

4.09,

p <.05

mean of the

other three

(see Table 2), with the high rational/high experiential group

reporting a lower level of anxiety than the other three groups. Follow-up analyses

revealed a significant contrast between the low rational/low experiential group and the

other three groups, F

=

10.27,

p <.003, with

the

low rational/low

reporting higher levels of anxiety than the other three groups.
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experiential group

Between-s ubiects Discre pancy Measnrpq
Analysis of the discrepancy measures based
on averaged systolic blood pressure
or heart rate produced no significant effects
or interactions. Analysis of the
measure

based on diastolic blood pressure showed a
significant rational by experiential
interaction,

F=

5.73,

p <.02

(see Table

1

and Figure

5).

All three measures showed a

significant contrast effect for the comparison
of the high rationality/high experientiality

group

to the

pressure,

mean of the

other three groups (for the measure based on
systolic blood

F = 4.05, u <.05;

heart rate, F

=

4.13,

for that based

p <.05;

see Table

1).

on

diastolic,

F=

5.35,

p

<.03; for that based on

Follow-up analyses showed no significant

contrasts for any of the other three groups. Thus, the
high rationality/high experientiality

group had mean discrepancy scores significantly higher than other
groups'. More than
other groups, these subjects were likely to give low ratings of
their general state of

anxiety relative to their average blood pressure during the experiment.

Analyses using the discrepancy variable based on the average of the

composite anxiety ratings produced almost the same pattern of significant
Table

2).

The only change was

for the discrepancy

were

still

low-rational groups

results (see

the absence of a rationality by experientiality interaction

measure based on

significant, in the

five

same

is different.

diastolic

blood pressure. The planned contrasts

direction. Note,

however, that the pattern of means for

In part, this reflects the tendency of the

low

rational/low experiential subjects to report significantly higher tension and anxiety than

do other groups when responding

to the mood-adjective checklist, as noted

"Between-subjects anxiety measures".
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above under

Thus, for

all six

of the between-subjects discrepancy
measures, Ihc high

rational/high experiential group had
significantly higher discrepancy
scores than the

other three groups. This difference in
discrepancy scores was due

lower self-ratings of anxiety given by

Men

Analysis for

As

m

large part to the

this group.

Womnn

and

the repeated-measures discrepancy variable
produced higher-order

interactions

which included

subjects' gender, the between-subjects
discrepancy

measures were also analyzed separately

for

men and women,

for men, both the rational

by experiential analysis and analysis of contrasts were based
on
freedom; for women, both analyses were based on

Analyses of the discrepancy measures
mteractions, or contrasts.

I

for

1

1

and 38 degrees of

and 30 degrees of freedom.

men

revealed no significant effects,

lowever, for the two discrepancy measures based on diastolic

blood pressure, the contrast between the high rational/high experiential
group and the

mean of the
anxiety, F

=

measure, F

other three groups approached significance (for the measure using
3.98,

=

p=

3.88,

trait

.053; for the measure using the averaged composite anxiety

p=

.056; see Table

blood pressure showed trends

in the

3).

same

1

he discrepancy scores based on systolic

direction (both Fs >3.00, both ps <.08).

with the corresponding contrast effccts for both

men and women,

the

As

mean discrepancy

score for the high rational/high experiential group was higher than that for the other

three groups, representing a tendency to give low estimates of anxiety relative to blood

pressure during the experiment.
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Investigating the components of the
discrepancy measures for men,
analysis of

average systolic and diastolic blood pressure
showed no significant effects or
interactions.

However,

significant contrasts

experiential group and the

mean of the

were found between the high rational/high

other three groups (both Fs

>

4.00, both ps <.05;

see Table 3), with that group recording the
highest average range-corrected blood
pressure.

trait

No

significant effects, interactions, or contrasts
were found for

anxiety measure.

based on

trait

The higher

men

for the

scores for this group on the discrepancy
measure

anxiety were thus not a result of lower anxiety, but
of their higher blood

pressure during the experiment. Analysis of the averaged
composite anxiety measure for

men produced
men

a significant effect for rationality, F

-

4.60,

u<

04, with high-rational

giving a lower average rating of anxiety than low-rational
men. This would

contribute to the higher scores for high rational/high experiential

men on

the

discrepancy measure using averaged composite anxiety.

Thus, high rational/high experiential

men

tended to have higher discrepancy

scores on the four between-subjects discrepancy measures using systolic or diastolic

blood pressure. These scores were a result of higher blood pressure, combined with

lower ratings by high-rational

men on one of the

Analyses of the discrepancy measures

self-report

for

measures of anxiety.

women produced

by experiential interaction for the discrepancy measure based on
pressure and

significant.

trait

anxiety score, F

=

4.28,

£ <.05

(see Table 4).

a significant rational

diastolic blood

No contrasts were

For the interaction, the high rational/high experiential group

two groups high

in discrepancy, although not higher than the
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is

one of the

group of low rational/low

experiential

group,

IS

other high-rational group, the high
rational/low experiential

one of the two groups low

in discrepancy.

The discrepancy measure using

blood pressure shows a rational by experiential
trend, F = 3.37,
p <.08, with the

systolic

same

women. The

pattern of means.

All three discrepancy measures using the
averaged composite anxiety score

showed

significant

main

effects for experientiality (Fs range

from 4.61,

using diastolic blood pressure, to 7.97, for the
measure using heart
all

three experiential effects, the

score, ranging

from -1.04

low

experiential group

for the

rate; all

measure

ps <.05). For

showed a negative discrepancy

to -.67, while the high experiential

group showed discrepancy

scores ranging from near zero (-.07 for the measure using systolic
blood pressure) to .79
(for the

measure using heart

rate).

Thus, low-experiential

women tended to

give high

estimates of tension and anxiety on the mood-adjective checklist, relative
to their blood

pressure and heart rate. High-experiential

to heart rate, but

women

gave low estimates of anxiety

roughly comparable estimates relative to blood pressure. Finally, a

significant contrast

was found

for

women for the

discrepancy between heart rate and

averaged composite anxiety score, with the group high
experientiality giving

P <.05

(see Table 4).

shows a trend

relative

for the

low estimates of their anxiety

in both rationality

relative to their heart rate,

The discrepancy measure based on
same

contrast,

F=

3.04,

p

physiological measures, or for the

trait

<. 10.

were found

for

women, no

any of the three averaged

anxiety measure. Thus, the significant
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F = 4.22,

heart rate and trait anxiety

Investigating the components of the discrepancy measures for

significant effects, interactions, or contrasts

and

discrepancy effect for the measure based on diastolic blood
pressure and
score

not explainable in terms of

is

its

the

was found between

mean of the

anxiety

component measures. Analysis of the averaged

composite anxiety score revealed no significant
contrast

trait

effects or interactions, but a significant

the group high in both rationality and experientiality
and

other three groups, F

=

5.97,

p <.03

(see Table 4). This group gave

lower ratings of anxiety over the course of the experiment than the other
three groups,

which would

result in higher discrepancy scores

on the measure using composite

anxiety score and heart rate, noted above.

For the averaged composite anxiety measure, a significant
experientiality

was

also found, F

=

10.48,

effect for

p <.004, with low-experiential women giving

higher average ratings of anxiety than high-experiential women. This would contribute
to the

main

effects for experientiality for the discrepancy measures using the composite

anxiety scores, noted above, as well as to the contrast for the high rational/high

experiential group.

Thus,

women high

in both rationality

discrepancy scores than other

based on heart

the

rate.

women,

and experientiality tended

groups, one of which

is

to

have higher

for both between-subjects discrepancy measures

For discrepancy scores based on

same group of women tends

to

trait

anxiety and blood pressure,

have higher discrepancy scores than two other

the group of high rational/low experiential
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women.

Supplement ary

Analyse.';

Analyses of the discrepancy measures and
performed, using variables unrelated

to the

their

components were also

hypotheses of interest but which could

possibly moderate the obtained results.
Social Desirability

Subjects had been pre-selected to represent a 2 (rationality,
upper and lower
quartile)

X2

(experientiality, upper

(social desirability,

desirability.

median

and lower quartile)

split) matrix, in

(gender of subject)

1

X2

order to be able to control for social

For the between-subjects discrepancy measures and

analyses were done using this design, on

their

components,

and 60 degrees of freedom. For the repeated-

measures analyses, analysis was performed using a 2
quartile)

X2

(rationality,

upper and lower

X 2 (experientiality, upper and lower quartile) X 2 (gender of subject) X 2

(social desirability,

median

split)

X5

(trials)

analysis of variance design. Degrees of

freedom were as noted.
For the repeated-measures variables, analyses revealed no main
desirability. Significant interactions including social desirability

found

and

for within-subjects range-controlled systolic blood pressure

by gender by social

rationality

measure

were

(rationality

desirability), the repeated-measures discrepancy variable based

systolic blood pressure (rationality

rationality

effects for social

by gender by

by

experientiality

social desirability),

by

social desirability,

on

and

and the discrepancy measure based on

diastolic blood pressure (rationality by experientiality
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by

social desirability).

However,

separate analyses for subjects high and low in social
desirability found no significant
effects or interactions for the relevant variables

and combinations of variables.

For the between-subjects discrepancy measures, the averaged
composite anxiety

measure and the three discrepancy measures based on
significant

main

that

measure

showed

all

effects for social desirability (for the anxiety measure,

<.010; for the three discrepancy measures,

desirability subjects

had negative values

all

Fs > 4.00,

all

F =8.12, ^

ps <.04). High social

for the standardized

composite self-rated

anxiety measure, and positive discrepancy scores, representing low estimations
of

anxiety relative to physiological measurements.

social desirability

or their

and

rationality, for

No

interactions

were found between

any of the between-subjects discrepancy measures

component measures.

Analyses bv Individual Research Assistant

A variable representing the three female research assistants was created, in order
to analyze the data for possible experimenter effects.

For the repeated-measures variables, analyses revealed no main

effects for

research assistant. Significant interactions involving rationality and the research

assistant variable

experientiality

assistant

by research

for the composite anxiety

assistant,

and

rationality

by

by gender), the discrepancy measure based on

(rationality

on heart

were found

by

experientiality

rate (rationality

by

by research

assistant),

experientiality

measure

(rationality

experientiality

diastolic

by

by research

blood pressure

and the discrepancy measure based

by research

assistant

by gender). Separate

analyses for subjects run by the three research assistants revealed only a significant
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within-subjects rational by experiential interaction
for one research assistant, for the

composite anxiety measure. Analysis of the measure
showed no important differences

from the pattern

for all subjects, although for the post-stress
period the high

rationality/high experiential ity group rated their anxiety
level as significantly higher

than the low rationality /high experientiality group.

For the between-subjects discrepancy measures and

their

components,

significant rationality by research assistant or rationality by gender
by research assistant

interactions

were found

for all but

two of the

variables. Separate analyses for

three research assistants revealed corresponding

by gender interactions for
five variables. All

all

main

each of the

effects for rationality or rational

but two of these, a total of eight effects or interactions for

of these effects were for the one research

assistant (not the

same

as in

the above paragraph).

For subjects run by

had higher overall heart
scores,

this research assistant, the

rates,

F =

1

3.60,

group of high rational subjects

p <.005, lower averaged composite anxiety

F = 22.56, p <.001, and higher discrepancy scores

composite anxiety scores

(all

Fs > 10.00,

all

for the

measures using

ps <.005). For the composite anxiety

measure, the discrepancy measure based on diastolic blood pressure and composite
anxiety, and the discrepancy measure based on heart rate and composite anxiety,

significant rational

by gender

interactions were driven by the group of

rationality/low experientiality subjects,

who had

low

higher self-ratings for anxiety, and

negative discrepancy scores, representing high ratings of anxiety relative to
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LatencxMeasures

physiological measurements

(all

Fs > 9.00,

all jds

<.010;

all

contrasts significant,

all

Fs

>11.00, allps <.005).

None of these
They

results conflicts with results obtained for the

sample as a whole.

will not be discussed further.

Analysis of Predictor Variables

Regression analysis was performed on the discrepancy measures and

component measures,

to

examine

their

the possible relationships between illusory mental

health and the variables available for study. Social desirability, self-deception,

rationality, experientiality,

and the

rational

and experiential derogation scales were

entered as predictor variables.

No

significant predictors

were found

for the averaged physiological measures.

For both between-subjects measures of anxiety,

rationality

and self-deception were

negative predictors, explaining more than twenty-five percent of the variance. These

two

variables were also positive predictors of the two discrepancy measures based

on

heart rate, accounting for thirteen percent of the variance on the two measures. Self-

deception by

itself

was a

positive predictor of the discrepancy measures based on blood

pressure, accounting for seven or eight percent of the variance for the four measures.

Social desirability

was

also a positive predictor of three of the six discrepancy measures,

although separately from rationality and self-deception.

Thus, there

is

a relationship between self-deception and illusory mental health,

and both are associated with higher

rationality scores.
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As a
were coded

preliminary investigation, subjects' responses from
the phrase-response task
for latency. Latencies

were analyzed both excluding absence of response

from the analysis, and assigning absences an

between phrases

(11 .60 seconds). Silences

available, inter-coder reliability

arbitrary latency equal to the shortest
time

were also analyzed. As only one coder was

was not achievable, and

results

must be regarded as

tentative.

For the more conservative measure, excluding absent responses, a
rational

by gender interaction was found

content,

F

(1 ,67)

significantly

=

4.07,

p

<.05.

High

more quickly than low

so that high rational

significant

for responses to phrases with aggressive

rational

men responded

men.

rational

women responded more

to these phrases

Women showed the

opposite pattem,

slowly than low rational women, although

not significantly. For phrases with sexual content, a significant main effect was found
for rationality,

slowly. This

F

(1,65)

=

5.26,

p <.03, with

was accompanied by

p=

.053, in

which

this

more

a nearly significant contrast between high

rational/high experiential subjects and the

3.89,

subjects high in rationality answering

mean of the

other three groups, F (1,69)

group answered more quickly than any other group.

=

No

significant effects, interactions, or contrasts were found for analysis of the phrases with

dependency-related content, or for

found with the

all stressful

phrases.

No

major differences were

less conservative latency measure.

Analysis of silences produced only a significant contrast for dependency-related
phrases, between the high rational/low experiential group and the
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mean of the

other

three groups,

F (1,71) =

significantly

more

5.21,

p

<.03, in

which

this

group failed to respond

to

phrases.

These findings are difficuh

to reconcile,

and not obviously relevant

to the

hypotheses under consideration.

Additional Measures

In addition to the measures relevant to testing the hypothesis
of illusory mental
health, several additional measures

were administered during the course of the

experiment. These were analyzed using the same 2
(experientiality, high vs. low)

X2

(rationality,

high vs. low)

X2

(gender of subject) design as before, based on

1

and

68 degrees of freedom except as noted. This analysis was followed by planned contrasts,

based on

1

and 72 degrees of freedom except

as noted,

rationality/low experientiality group to the overall

the

mean

comparing the mean

mean

for the other three groups,

for the high rationality /high experientiality group to the overall

other three groups.

Means

for the high

for variables with significant rational

interactions or significant contrasts are displayed in Table

mean

and

for the

by experiential

5.

Medical Check-list

A check-list was administered, assessing the incidence of common illnesses,
medical conditions, and accidents, as well as the number of visits

therapists.

With one exception

(the

to doctors

and

measure of total symptoms, described below), none

of the multi-item variables on the checklist (emotional symptoms, psychophysical

symptoms, infectious

diseases, self-control issues) produced significant effects,

interactions, or contrasts. Significant results

were obtained for three single-item
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measures and one summary measure. Items addressing whether
subjects were currently
receiving psychotherapy and the

number of visits

to therapists during the past three

years could not be analyzed, as only five subjects out of 76
responded to each.

An

item asking whether or not subjects were currently receiving
medical

treatment produced a main effect for rationality, F = 4.65,
p <.035, with high-rational
subjects

more

likely to

be receiving medical treatment. This effect was driven by
the

high rationality /low experientiality group, as shown by the contrast of that
group to the

mean of the
the

other three groups, F

number of visits

experientiality,

significantly

to doctors

=

1

^ =.001

1.50,

(see Table 5).

A question assessing

produced a significant interaction between

and gender, F = 6.83, p <.02

from other groups

rationality,

(see Table 6), although no group differed

in range tests.

Analysis of ratings of overall satisfaction with physical health produced a
significant

main

effect for experientiality,

subjects reporting higher satisfaction.

group high

in

A

F = 6.17, p <.02, with high

significant contrast

was

experiential

also found between the

both rationality and experientiality and the mean of the other three groups,

F = 6.56, p <.02,

in

which

that

group expressed the greatest

health. Finally, a significant interaction

was found between

and gender, F = 4.65, p <.04 (see Table

6),

though

it is

satisfaction with their

rationality, experientiality,

quite complex.

A summary

variable of total physical health also produced a three-way interaction, F

again,

it

is

difficult to interpret,

and range

tests

between means.
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showed no

=

5.76,

p

significant differences

<.02;

The Sackeim and Gur Self-Deception Scale
was administered during

the

experiment, as a potential criterion variable for
physiological measures. The measure

can be interpreted as having a continuous
response
willingness to acknowledge

common

scale,

making

it

a measure of

but discomforting thoughts; or as a
dichotomous

measure, assessing denial. Both interpretations showed
a main effect
Fs > 6.00

,

for experientiality,

28 <.02, with high experiential subjects showing higher levels
of denial than

low experiential

subjects.

The dichotomous

interpretation also

showed a

contrast effect,

with the group high in both rationality and experientiality
showing a higher score for
denial than any other group, F

Measures Pertinent

=

4.73,

to Rationalitv

p <.04

(see Table 5).

and Experientiality

Unsurprisingly, significant main effects were found for measures of
rational

derogation and experiential derogation, included
rational derogation, a

main

effect

rational subjects

showing higher

two

More

to

one

ratio.

that scores for

was found

for rationality,

For

F = 38.33, p <.001, with low

levels of rational derogation than high rationals, by a

interestingly, range tests

low rational/low

in the pre-screening questionnaire.

found a difference between means, such

experiential subjects

were

significantly higher than

those for low rational/high experiential subjects, which in turn were significantly higher

than those for either of the high rational groups (see Table

experientiality

was found

for experiential derogation,

low experiential subjects almost twice

5).

A main effect for

F = 34.41 p <.001 with scores
,

,

as high as those for high experiential subjects.
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for

Personal Relationship s

Several measures on the pre-screening questionnaire
dealt with subjects'

personal history.

Two

attachment style prototype questions, out of
four, showed

significant effects for experientiality, as well as
significant contrasts.

The

fearful

attachment style prototype was more likely to be endorsed
as typical by low
experientiality subjects,

F (1,67) =

8.60,

p <.010, with high

rationality/high

experientiality subjects less likely than the other three
groups to endorse the prototype,

F (1,71) = 4.45, p <.04 (see Table
opposite pattern:

(1,67)

=

5.12,

p

it

was more

5).

The secure attachment

likely to be endorsed

style prototype

by high experientiality

subjects,

<.03, and high rationality/high experientiality subjects were

than subjects in the other three groups to endorse

it,

showed the

more

F

likely

F (1,71) = 6.61, p <.02 (see Table

5).

Finally, a

main

effect for experientiality,

likely to worry.

more

measure assessing

F=

subjects' degree

8.31,

of worrying showed a significant

p <.010, with low

experientiality subjects

more

A main effect was also found for gender, F = 5.64, p <.03, with men

likely than

women to

worry.

A significant contrast was found between the high

rational/high experiential group and the

mean of the

other three groups, F

=

6.75,

p <.02

(see Table 5), with that group less likely than subjects in any of the other three groups to

describe themselves as worrying.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
This study sought to provide an alternative
explanation for self-reports of low
levels of psychological distress

rational.

by individuals who also

The hypothesis of the study was

identify themselves as highly

that these self-reports

were evidence of

illusory mental health, the minimization of
displayed anxiety and distress. If highly
rational individuals

showed

greater physiological reactivity to stress than
did other

individuals, self-reports of low psychological distress
could be reinterpreted as being
intentionally or unintentionally misleading.

Summary of Results
The study demonstrated

patterns of discrepancies

between physiological

and self-reported anxiety. These discrepancies were consistently associated

indicators

with the group of high rational/high experiential individuals, and not with
other groups.

Discrepancy measures were calculated for each of five measurement periods, as
well as for the over-all discrepancy between self-reported anxiety and physiological
reactivity.

interpret,

Analyses of the repeated-measures discrepancy variables were

and did not support the

difficult to

study's hypothesis. For these measures, the only

evidence directly bearing on the question of illusory mental health for either of the high
rational groups

health, for the

was

a relatively

low discrepancy

score, the opposite of illusory mental

group of high rational/low experiential
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women

in the recovery period.

For the over-all discrepancy scores, the high
rational/high experiential group

showed higher
both

levels of illusory mental health than
other groups did. This result held
for

men and women.
Thus, some high-rational individuals did under-report
anxiety relative

compared

to individuals in other groups.

However, the group

to arousal,

in question consisted

of

individuals high in both rationality and experientiality.
Individuals high in rationality

but low in experientiality showed no evidence of such
under-reporting. Because a

secondary hypothesis of the study was that high rational/high
experiential individuals

would show

less evidence of illusory mental health than other
groups, these results are

unexpected. In considering the validity of the hypothesis, and
the consequences of the

observed

results, limitations

of the study should be taken

into account.

Validity of Experimental Data

The measures of discrepancy were based on

differences between physiological

data and self-report data. There are grounds for skepticism regarding both types of

measures.

Physiological measures of heart rate and blood pressure are not necessarily
accurate measures of the effect of stress.

measuring only the response
Different individuals

As was

No

physiological measure

to a specific stimulus,

is

unambiguous,

even for a single individual.

may show different physiological

responses to the same stimuli.

seen in the present study, different physiological indices do not necessarily

correlate with each other, as the reactions they measure are elicited by different stimuli

and follow different response patterns over time. Thus, heart
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rate

responds more quickly

to stimuli than does blood pressure,
including anticipated as well as
actual physical
effort.

Heart rate also tends to decelerate when
the individual concentrates
on some

stimuli.

For blood pressure, systolic pressure
shows a different pattern than

being more sensitive to stimulation and thus

The instrument used
relatively crude machine.

for heart rate,

which

is

to

more

less stable than diastolic.

measure physiological

The low

reliability

of such an instrument

blood pressure gave stronger and more consistent

results

were obtained

for

reactivity in this study

easily observed than blood pressure.

consequence of that measure's greater

diastolic,

stability.

is

The

a

less problematic

fact that diastolic

results than did systolic

The

is

fact that significant

may

be a

and consistent

measures of discrepancy based on blood pressure

is

noteworthy, given the low reliability of the instrument
used.

The

relative

absence of significant effects for the self-report data

consequence of the low

variability

of the

data. Self-reports

no significant differences between groups on

is

partly a

of tension or anxiety showed

the repeated-measures variable.

To

the

extent that self-reported anxiety differed from physiological measures, but was
intended
to assess the

same underlying

construct,

it

can be considered to be inaccurate. Self-

reported anxiety followed a consistent pattern, declining over the course of the

experiment, rising in the post-stress measurement period, and dropping to

its

lowest

point in the final recovery and relaxation periods. This was a predictable path, and

therefore need not have represented accurate self-awareness or self-report.

Consequently,

it

may have been

in fact

an accurate report of subjects' feelings, or their

attempt to present reasonable responses. However, the high
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initial

values, matching high

initial

readings for the physiological measures,
seem consistent with some subjective

awareness of actual arousal.

Experimental Manip ulations

The purpose of the experimental manipulations was
situation, in

which

subjects' physiological responses to
stress could be examined.

must be acknowledged
their effect in

The
period

that in

most cases the

It

actual manipulations failed to achieve

an unambiguous fashion.

relatively high readings

may represent

most subjects

to create a stressful

on physiological indices

for the first

measurement

a response to a novel and somewhat threatening
situation. For

this reading

was comparable

to the post-stress reading. Thus, the stress

manipulation did not necessarily represent an increase
situation. Alternatively, the relatively

weak

in stress

over the baseline

physiological response in the post-stress

period could be a result of a ceiling effect: a proportionately greater stress
might have

been necessary

to elevate the physiological indices

mechanisms may

also have

come

above

into play. Subjects

this point. Self-protective

may have

unconsciously suppressed their physiological responses to the

by focussing on the content of the

stimuli.

The

consciously or

stress tasks, for

example

tentative explanation of heart rate

deceleration in the post-stress period as a consequence of increased attentiveness would

be congruent with

this suppression hypothesis.

Additional Measures

Analyses of the additional measures administered
the nature of the

two high-rational groups.
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in this study is illustrative

of

ligh rational/low experiential
individuals arc characleri/,cd only
by being

1

likely to

be under medical treatment. This Hnding
seems inconsistent with

more

self-

deception and with illusory mental health.
Dillcrential tendency to seek
medical
treatment

The

may

indicate health problems, or simply a
greater attentiveness to symptoms.

Tact that this

group did not show more physical symptoms
than other groups, as

assessed on the medical checklist, supports the

latter

conclusion.

This group also showed lower discrepancy scores

in the

recovery period, the

consequence of declines

in

reported anxiety. This

evidence of the low correlation between self-report
and

is

physiological measures.

It

blood pressure without corresponding declines

may

in self-

also redect a conservative tendency to
over-estimate

anxiety relative to physical arousal, consistent with the
hypothesized higher level of

self-assessment concerning health issues mentioned above.

High rational/high

experiential individuals, on the other hand, arc characterized

by having a secure and not a

fearful attachment style,

by engaging

in neither rational

nor

experiential derogation, by not worrying, and by having relatively high scores on a

measure of self-deception. This
levels

of anxiety,

last

fmding casts the others

their secure relationships, their lack

presentational. These subjects' high scores

experientiality

may

in doubt.

Perhaps their low

of worrying, are

on measures of both

all self-

rationality

and

also be self-presentational.

The two high-rational groups differ

The assumptions made about

in their self-reported level

of cxpcriciitialily

this variable colored the study's hypotheses.

hypothesized that experientiality would moderate rationality
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This study

in the direction

of positive

psychological health, evidenced by lower
scores on a measure of illusory
mental health.

Given the

results,

demonstrating the opposite of the hypothesis
of lower illusory mental

health for the high rational/high experiential
group,

tendency

exists, but in the direction

possible that a moderating

it is

of illusory mental health.

Questions Regardi ng

Assump tions;

Both the independent and dependent variables used

in this study

may admit

reinterpretation.

In considering possible moderating effects on rationality,
experientiality

be the operative variable. The measure of experientiality used
this study is

However,

intuition.

does not fully capture the nature of experiential processing according
to

Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory. In addition,
experientiality

not

in the pre-screening for

based on an operationalization of experiential processing as

this

may

it is

possible that individuals high in

do not think of themselves as especially

intuitive.

The

intuitive ability,

perhaps unlike rationality, need not be connected to any objective awareness of such
ability, let

alone to

its

incorporation into the self-image.

It

may

not be directly

assessable using self-report, and individuals reporting high levels of experientiality

may

not be representative of all highly experiential individuals.

One assumption made

in the design

of the study was

that

extreme scores

represented a greater degree of the attribute, rather than a qualitative difference from

less

extreme scores. Subjects were chosen from a pool of individuals with extreme

scores on measures of rational and experiential processing. Their high standing on both

rationality

and experientiality may also mean
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that these individuals are

extreme in other

ways. Describing oneself as highly rational
requires a certain level of self-esteem.
To
the degree that claiming intuitive ability
likewise demonstrates a positive
self-image,

individuals in the high rational/high
experiential group

may

possess a level of self-

esteem unrepresentative of the general
population.

The dependent measure of illusory mental
reactivity.

It

was assumed

physiological reactivity

situations.

The

that

may

high reactivity

in fact represent

An

may

was based on physiological

a response to stress. Higher

an adaptive response to

issue of maladaptive responses

recovery patterns: an adaptive response
recovery.

is

health

may

stressful

better be addressed

by examining

consist in high reactivity followed by rapid

attempt to do this was made, by including the final
relaxation period, with

guided relaxation imagery. However, as the physiological data
make evident,

either this

manipulation did not work, and possibly backfired, or such relaxation
does not affect
the physiological measures used.

The dependent
assumption made by

variable of illusory mental health

this study

high physiological reactivity

maladaptive. However,there

is

was

that

low

may

also be misunderstood.

self-reported anxiety in the presence of

evidence of ill health, either mental or physical, and

may

An

is

not be serious negative consequences to illusory

mental health. Illusory mental health

may

represent denial, or

it

may

represent bias

towards positive interpretations.

The

relationship between illusory mental health and self-deception demonstrated

by regression analyses argues against the adaptive
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interpretation. Illusory mental health

is

adaptive only to the degree that self-deception

is

adaptive. This also can be debated,

but such debate cannot be addressed in this
discussion.

On the

other hand, if illusory mental health and
self-deception entail

physiological or psychological costs to the individual,
decrements in performance

should be obtained. The absence of latency effects
for the group high

in illusory

mental

health, high rational/high experiential individuals,
argues against that understanding of

self-deception.

Conclusions

This study provides evidence that individuals

and experientiality are also characterized by

who

are high in both rationality

illusory mental health.

Are these

attributes

manifestations of an underlying variable, such as high self-esteem?
or are they causally
related to each other?

What

function does the illusion of mental health serve?

Is

it

an

element of social desirability?

We

can speculate that illusory mental health

control. Rationality

may

involve issues of perceived

represent a form of control over one's experiences, creating

order in the individual's world.

intensity of perceptions

may

It is

also possible that experientiality

and reactions

control in order that the individual

may

to stimuli, necessitating a relatively

may

involve an

high degree of

experience some sense of security. Evidence of

higher levels of positive functioning exhibited by the high rational/high experiential

group may be due to differences

in subjective well-being, depressive realism, or

unrealistic optimism.
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Are those who show signs of illusory
mental health aware of the
Weinberger (1990) examined repressors,
individuals with low

sought to limit their
people's. Davis

own

awareness of their negative

and Schwartz (1987) found

affect,

that repressors

of self-reported

levels

anxiety but relatively high scores on
measures of social desirability.

illusion?

He found

that they

and not merely other

had limited retention of both

negative and positive affective memories,
relative to high-anxious and
non-defensive

low-anxious individuals.

If self-deception is effective in
reducing perceived stress

enhancing perceived control of one's environment,
need

Awareness of one's

illusions,

it

and

have negative consequences?

and the consequences of those

illusions, is

intimately connected to the study of thinking styles
and processing modes. The goals of
the individual must be associated with the

means whereby those goals

are reached and

with the individual's self-image. The degree of integration
of experientiality and
rationality

must have consequences both

for self-image

and

life goals.

Thus, the moderating effect of experientiality on rationality
only in determining whether rationality

is

a positive

trait in itself.

nature of rationality, and the development of human functioning,
the relative strengths of human abilities.

The question of the

is

The
is

of interest not

issue of the

also a question of

best use of those abilities

central to the definition of the individual. Adult developmental patterns

may

is

well

involve the interaction and integration of the two thinking styles (Labouvie-Vief, 1990).

Wisdom may be

the ability to use both the strengths of the rational system, and the

strengths or weaknesses of the experiential system, to arrive at answers to questions in a

real, irrational,

world.
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Table

1

Means

for Trait

report

Measures

Anxiety Discrepancy Measures and Component Physiological and

lowR/

highRy

low R/

low E

low E

high

14

17

20

25

Systolic blood pressure

0.05,

-0.31,

0.04,

0.15,

Diastolic blood pressure

0.17,

-0.37,

-0.08,

0.22,

-0.09,

-0.10,

-0.07,

0.18,

N

Heart rate

Trait anxiety score

Systolic

minus

Diastolic

trait

minus

anxiety

trait

Heart rate minus

anxiety

trait

anxiety

lllgll ISJ

E

high

0.02,,

-0.03,,

0.40,

-0.31,

0.03,

-0.28,

-0.36,

0.46,

0.15,,

-0.34,,

-0.48,

0.53,

-0.1 lab

-0.07,,

-0.47,

0.49,

E

Note. All component variables standardized. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality;
"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;

"Trait anxiety score": Taylor Manifest Anxiety score.

Means

not sharing the

same

subscript differ significantly,
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p

<.05.

Self-

Table 2

Means

for Averaged State Anxiety Discrepancy Measures
and
Physiological and Self-report Measures

Component

low Ky
low E

high R/

low R/

highR/

low E

high E

high

14

17

20

25

Systolic blood pressure

0.05,

-0.31,

0.04,

0.15,

Diastolic blood pressure

0.17,

-0.37,

-0.08,

0.22,

-0.09,

-0.10,

-0.07,

0.18,

0.7\

-0.18,

-0.01,

-0.29,

-0.69,

-0.14,,

0.06,,

0.44,

-0.58,

-0.19,,

-0.07,,

0.50,

-0.83,

0.07,,

-0.06,,

0.46,

N

Heart rate

Averaged

Systolic

state anxiety score

minus

Diastolic

state anxiety

minus

state anxiety

Heart rate minus state anxiety

Note All component variables standardized.
.

E

"R": rationality; "E": experientiality;

"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;

"State anxiety score": averaged repeated-measures composite mood-adjective anxiety
score.

Means

not sharing the

same

subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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Table 3

Means

for Selected Discrepancy

report Measures, for

XT
IN

Diastolic blood pressure

Trait anxiety score

Diastolic

minus

trait

Measures and Component Physiological and

Self-

Men

anxiety

low RJ
low E

high RJ

low R/

low E

high

8

10

11

13

0.21ab

-0.29,

-0.03,u

0 65u

0.28,

-0.04,

0.30,

-0.07,

-0.25,

-0.33,

0.71,

E

high E

-0.06

Diastolic blood pressure

0.21,,

-0.29,

-0.03,,

0.65,

Averaged

0.62,

-0.49,

0.21,,

-0.17,,

-0.41,

0.19,

Diastolic

state anxiety score

minus

state anxiety

Note All component variables
.

-0.25,

0.83,

standardized. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality;

"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;
"Trait anxiety score": Taylor Manifest Anxiety score;

"State anxiety score": averaged repeated-measures composite mood-adjective anxiety
score.

Means

not sharing the

same

subscript differ significantly,
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p

<.05.

I'able

4

Means

for Selected

Discrepancy Measures and Component Physiological
and

rcport Measures, for

N

low KJ

nigh Ry

low R/

high RI

low E

low E

highE

high E

6

7

9

12

-0.47,

-0.14,

-0.25,

0.52,

-0.58,

n
U.

Trplit Jinxiptv

Diastolic

1

1^

trait

Ct n 1
-U.Ul,,,

anxiety

Heart rate

Averaged

1

srorp

minus

Selt-

Women

state anxiety score

Heart rate minus state anxiety

0.44,

-0.46,

-0.66,

0.33,

-0.46,

0.20,

0.44,

0.43,

0.90,

0.27,,

-0.29,

-0.41,

-1.37,

-0.07,,

0.73,

0.84,

Note All component variables standardized. "R":
.

rationality; "E": experientiality;

"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;
"Trait anxiety score": Taylor Manifest Anxiety score;

"State anxiety score": averaged repeated-measures composite mood-adjective anxiety
score.

Means

not sharing the

same

subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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Table 5

Means

for Additional

Measures

lowR/

highR/
low E

lowR/
high E

highR/

low E
14

17

20

25

0.24,

0.00,

0.04,

Receiving psychotherapy, yes or no O.O?,,

0.18,

0.05,,

0.00,

Therapy sessions past

1.21,

1.00,

0.20,

0.28,

health

2.29,

2.53,,

2.75,,

3.12,

Self-deception, dichotomous scale

0.48,

0.53,,

0.61,,

0.64,

Experiential derogation

2.01,

1.82,

1.16,

0.87,

Rational derogation

1.96,

0.74,

1.47,

0.78,

Fearful attachment style

5.00,

3.88,,

2.80,

2.58,

Secure attachment style

3.14,

4.35,,

4.55,,

5.58,

Worry

2.90,

2.75,

2.37,,

2.03,

N
Under medical treatment, yes

3 years

How satisfied with physical

scale

Note "R":
.

Means

or no 0.00^

rationality; "E": experientiality.

not sharing the

same

subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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high

E

Table 6

Means

for Additional

Measures by Rationality,

Men:
low R/ high R/ lowR/
lowE lowE highE

N
Visit physician

Therapy
Satisfied

Symptoms

8

2.12,

Experientiality,

and Gender

Women:
highR/ lowRy
highE lowE

high R/ low Ry

high R/

low E

high

high E

7

9

E

10

11

13

1.60,

1.09,

1.85,

1.00,

1.86,

2.11a

1.33,

6

12

1.50b

0.50,

0.00,

0.23,

0.83,b

1.71b

0.44,

0.33,

2.12ab

2.90,,,

3.00,be

3.08b,

2.50,b,

2.00,

2.44,b,

3.17,

12.88, 11.50,

11.36,

13.77,

8.83,

17.43,

15.78,

11.83,

Note. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality; "Visit physician": visits to physician
during
past year; "Therapy": number of sessions during past three years; "Satisfied": how
satisfied they reported being

with their physical health; "Symptoms":

symptoms reported.
Means not sharing the same

subscript differ significantly,
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p

<.05.

total physical

pre-stress post-stress recovery
Systolic

Diastolic

relaxation

Heart rate

-corrected Physiological Measures: Blood Pressure and Heart Rate
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2a

Range-corrected

diastolic blood pressure
for

men

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

beflln

pro-stroas post-stress recovary

Milow R/low E
'

Miloyv

2b.

R/hIgh E

M

relaxation

hlgh R/low E

Mihigh R/hIgh E

Range-corrected

diastolic blood pressure
for

women

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

bogin

prt-8tre«« post-Stress recovery

Wilow n/low E

-

W:low n/high e

I'igure 2.

W high

I

'

'

relaxation

R/low E

W:hlgh R/hIgh E

Rangc-corrcclcd Diastolic Blood Pressure
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3a.

Range-corrected composite anxiety score
for men

begin
M: low

pre-stress post-stress

R/low E

M: high

M: low R/hIgh E

3b.

recovery

relaxation

R/low E

M: high R/hIgh E

Range-corrected composite anxiety score
for women

begin

pre-stress post-stress

recovery

relaxation

W: low R/low E

W: high R/low E

W: low R/high E

W: high R/hIgh E

Figure

3.

Range-corrected Composite Anxiety Score
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4b.

Diastolic blood pressure minus anxiety
for

women

0.8 r

Figure

4. Diastolic

Blood Pressure Minus Anxiety
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Diastolic blood pressure

minus

trait

anxiety score

low rationality

low experientiality

Figure

5.

Diastolic

high rationality

^Shigh

Blood Pressure Minus

57

experientiality

Trait Anxiety Score
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